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WHITHER THE PRESS: THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE
JOURNALISM OF BLAME
Gerald G. Ashdown*
I. THE ROLE OF THE PRESS
As all who are familiar with the history of the media in this country
realize, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' marked the beginning of a new era
of freedom for the press in the coverage of public events. New York Times
and its progeny unshackled news stories from the chill of libel litigation.
The American public was the primary beneficiary of the Supreme Court's
1960s foray into the law of defamation. The press was now able to publish
virtually any story about public persons,2 and for a time any story of public
interest, 3 without fear of a successful libel suit. Because of this new license,
there was less need for restraint in reporting, and we can assume that as a
result much information that formerly would have been censored was now
filtered to readers and viewers. When I wrote about this phenomenon in the
1970s,' I argued (and still maintain but with somewhat less enthusiasm) that
the unshackling of the news media was healthy for participatory democracy.
Not only is the flow of information to the public directly correlated with the
effective exercise of choice by voters, but a vigilant and unintimidated press
is also capable of affecting policy by exposing corruption, waste, and fool-
ishness.'
These are the two dominant policies behind the Freedom of the Press
Clause in the First Amendment-the press as critic and the press as educa-
tor.6 Unlike freedom of speech, which is partly concerned with the self-
fulfillment and psychological and emotional growth of the individual speak-
Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Walker v. Associated
Press, 191 So. 2d 727 (La. Ct. App. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 28 (1967).
3 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
4 Gerald G. Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study In Constitutional Policy-Mak-
ing, 61 MINN. L. REv. 645 (1977) [hereinafter Ashdown, Constitutional Policy-Mak-
ing]; Gerald G. Ashdown, Media Reporting and Privacy Claims: Decline In Constitu-
tional Protection for the Press, 66 KY. L.J. 759 (1978) [hereinafter Ashdown, Media
Reporting and Privacy].
5 Ashdown, Media Reporting and Privacy, supra note 4, at 760.
6 For a thorough discussion of the evolution of the Free Press Clause, see David A.
Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455 (1983).
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er, the constitutional policy underlying freedom of the press is limited to its
function in the marketplace of ideas and the corresponding facilitation of the
democratic process.' It is the job of the press to report, discuss, and evalu-
ate events, ideas, and governmental activities. Its constitutional role is just
as the term "reporter" describes-to report and create the mix and maw of
the marketplace of ideas and information which can be utilized to make both
informed political choices and decisions about daily life.
This role is not to be undervalued; it is an ominous responsibility. The
days of the soapbox and getting information about the world from one's
neighbors have long since passed. Our principle source of news and infor-
mation is the modern media-newspapers, magazines, television, and radio.
These sources select much of what we read, watch, and hear. Together,
these sources program the collective public computer and ultimately form
public opinion which is then reported back to us in a self-propelling helix.
The function of a free press is to be uncontrolled by government, to act as a
watchdog over government, and to provide us with the information that
facilitates personal and political decision-making and fosters personal and
professional growth. Whether the subject be a police commissioner,' a re-
tired general,9 an athletic director,' ° or a real estate developer," since
1964 when the Supreme Court decided New York Times, the press has been
relatively unrestrained by the threat of libel litigation in performing its con-
stitutional function.
II. THE PINNACLE OF PROTECTION
Constitutional insulation from libel awards reached its pinnacle in 1971
when the Supreme Court decided Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.'2 In
Rosenbloom, the Court held that if the media defendant was reporting on
any matter of public interest, the plaintiff, in order to recover, was required
to prove that the story was published with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard for the truth. 3 Recklessness was clearly defined. The
Court stated that reckless disregard for the truth was "not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have
investigated before publishing," but rather, by whether "[t]here [was] suffi-
cient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."
See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 113 S. Ct. 1806, 1808 (1993).See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
See Walker, 191 So. 2d at 730.
'o See Butts, 388 U.S. at 135.
See Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7 (1970).
12 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
'3 Id. at 44.
Id. at 56 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
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Following Rosenbloom, members of the media were protected from
virtually all libel suits. 5 Whereas previous decisions had limited the consti-
tutional shield to stories regarding public officials and public figures, now
even libelous reports about private individuals were protected as long as
they contained an element of public interest.' 6 This standard was essentially
self-defining. The fact that a story was chosen for coverage ipso facto made
it a matter of public interest. For who, if not the press, are experts in this
field? Selecting a story for publication christens it as a subject of public
interest. Although a later Supreme Court decision relaxed the standard to
one of negligence when a private individual was involved, 7 the news me-
dia continued to be virtually insulated from libel suits-by the New York
Times actual malice standard when a public person was the plaintiff and by
the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. negligence standard when a private individu-
al filed suit.
There have been some libel awards against media defendants, but since
New York Times and its progeny, they have been infrequent and often have
been reversed on appeal. 8 The threat of a libel award no longer acts as a
"S For a discussion of the rapid rise in the use of the New York Times rule, see W.
WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE 30 (1989) (describing the brief period between
Rosenbloom and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), as the "pinnacle" of
the expansion of the actual malice rule).
16 Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43-44.
17 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (permitting states to establish their own tests "so long
as they do not impose liability without fault").
18 One of the most publicized libel recoveries was that of Carol Burnett against the
National Enquirer. Although the jury originally awarded Burnett $300,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $1.3 million in punitive damages, the amount ultimately was reduced
by the trial judge and again by the California appellate court to $50,000 compensatory
and $150,000 punitive damages. Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206,
219-20 (Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984). Probably the most
recent libel recovery to hold up on appeal is that of a West Virginia lawyer who sued a
Charleston, West Virginia newspaper that had accused him of bilking clients. Hinerman
v. Daily Gazette Co., 423 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1384
(1993). Hinerman recovered $75,000 actual and $300,000 punitive damages. Hinerman,
423 S.E.2d at 571, 578-79.
The largest libel damage award on record, $1.5 million in actual damages and $25
million in punitive damages (ranking as one of the largest jury verdicts of all time), was
overturned by a 2-1 vote of a 10th Circuit Court of Appeals panel. Pring v. Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). In
another celebrated libel case, William Tavoulareas, President of Mobil Oil Corporation,
sued the Washington Post for alleging that he had used his influence and Mobil assets
to set up his son in business. The large damage award granted by the jury, $250,000
compensatory damages and $1.8 million punitive damages, was overturned by the trial
judge, then reinstated by a 2-1 vote of a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The panel decision was reversed en
banc in favor of the Washington Post. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 798 (D.C.
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real governor on publication decisions. Although the cost of defending a
libel suit has the potential to discourage hasty publication of possibly libel-
ous material, the realities of both the media and litigation markets diffuse
this threat. The media is in a rush to get the story out-to scoop other pub-
lications. When this rush is coupled with the realization that a libel suit
requires either a wealthy plaintiff willing to bear the costs of litigation or a
lawyer willing to take a libel case on a contingent fee basis, future libel
litigation costs seem remote.
Another important factor in reducing media fear of libel litigation is the
unwillingness of defamed persons to sue.19 Those who feel they have been
libeled are generally justifiably reluctant to sue. A libel suit resurrects a
matter which has ended, makes the plaintiffs behavior and integrity a public
issue again, and requires the plaintiff to prove that the story was false and
that the media defendant published the story maliciously or at least negli-
gently, while the defendant tries to show that it had the story right. This is
not a pleasant thought for a prospective libel plaintiff. Thus, the realistic
threat to the news media of libel suits and litigation costs is minimal.
Of course, this is precisely the policy behind the constitutional privilege.
For nearly three decades the conflict between personal reputation and free-
dom of the press has been decided resoundingly in favor of the latter.2
This is how it should be in an era of responsible journalism. The harm
caused to an individual by a libelous publication is largely ephemeral. Al-
though cherished historically (hence the development of the defamation
cause of action), one's reputation has little tangible value.2' Occasionally, a
job, an election, or a future opportunity might be lost due to the publication
of a libelous story, but this is not the norm. More generally, the damage is
psychological and emotional, and only infrequently are there any physical
manifestations of such damage. Nevertheless, the personal trauma can be
extreme.
The other side of the libel equation is on balance more profound, re-
quiring vigilance and patronization. Freedom of speech and press are the
very vibrancy of our culture. Curtailing these freedoms retards sociopolitical
progression. Although reference to a "marketplace of ideas" has been over-
used,22 the basic notion is sound. Better cultural choices and wiser political
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987).
This is undoubtedly the reason that there are not more libel suits filed by public
figures, politicians, and elected public officials.
20 Ashdown, Constitutional Policy-Making, supra note 4, at 651.
2 Id. at 655; see, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 711-12 (1976) (holding
that an interest in reputation is not constitutionally protected by the liberty or property
guarantees of the Due Process Clause).
22 See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 458 (1991); Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3 (1990); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55
(1988); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 782 (1986); Red Lion
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assessments are likely to increase in direct proportion to the amount of in-
formation that is filtering and percolating through the public domain. This
informational marketplace is the fuel that drives a culture. The uniqueness
of the American culture and participatory democracy are made possible by
freedom of expression.
Free expression has two components-the right to speak and the right to
listen or receive information.23 Freedom of the press primarily relates to the
latter of these. It is the constitutional role of the American news media to
collect, distill, and publish information about life, law, science, religion, and
politics so that individually and collectively we can make decisions about
how to govern our lives. Of course, these decisions could be made in a
vacuum without knowledge about what is occurring in the world around us,
but they would be uninformed and ignorant at best, and dangerous at worst.
Without the modem media's service in the wholesale dissemination of infor-
mation, we would be culturally and politically adrift. The world has become
much too complex to rely on friends and neighbors, the pamphleteer, and
the pony express for our daily diet of news. Even the nineteenth century
newspaper would be an anachronism in the modem age. Like it or not, we
need computers, laser printers, national distribution, satellites, and major
networks to keep up with events.
But in addition to its distributional function, the press also plays a
speaker's role. Part of the constitutional obligation of the news media is to
evaluate governmental behavior and public events, and to expose corruption,
waste, and foolishness.24 Here, as in the role of disseminator of informa-
tion, freedom of the press transcends the philosophy embodied in individual
free speech. Although freedom of speech is intended, in part, to serve a
similar goal, individual speakers, unless they have the financial wherewithal
of a Ross Perot, simply do not have the impact and influence of the modem
news media (unless, of course, they attract media coverage). To be influen-
tial, critiques and expos6s must reach a wide audience. This is part of the
policy underlying the constitutional imprimatur granted the press.
The dual functions of the press-disseminator of information to the
public and guardian of the public trust-has led to both the rise and fall of
the news media. Constitutional insulation from libel actions was granted due
to a realization of the importance of these two functions. The availability of
libel litigation resulting in large damage awards, with truthfulness as the
only means of exoneration,25 has tremendous potential to create a self-cen-
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
23 Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376 n.5
(10th Cir. 1981).
24 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
25 The well settled common law rule prior to decisions by the United States Su-
preme Court was that truth, the only defense to a defamation action, must be pleaded
and proved by the defendant. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
1994]
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soring press, especially regarding critical or controversial stories. Material
whose accuracy could not be absolutely verified beforehand simply would
not be published. The result would be a substantial reduction in the amount
of information and critical commentary available to the public. It was this
phenomenon that New York Times and its progeny were designed to prevent
by shielding the press from most libel actions.
III. THE JOURNALISM OF BLAME
The interplay between the constitutionally recognized prerogatives of the
press both to report the "news" and to comment on public events has caused
dissention. The watchdog service performed by the press has a major
distributional component. Without the ability of the news media to reach a
large public audience, this aspect of freedom of the press would be no more
significant than individual free speech. In a sense, the Constitution protects
the press because it is independent of government and, most importantly,
can maintain a national pulpit. Thus, the reporting and critiquing functions
blend together in a mire of mass production that tends to camouflage self-
generated news from news created by the press through its commentary. The
trouble lies at this juncture of reporting and commentary, where it appears
that the constitutionally appointed wholesalers of news help to create that
which they are supposed to merely report. With respect to public events or
governmental actions, this can be like listening to a description by an art or
music critic. Reporters and editors actually see their task as putting a slant
or an explanation on the news, elevating their stature beyond mere objective
purveyors of information to the public.
The press certainly has performed a valuable national service by expos-
ing major political shenanigans such as Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair.
The media, however, also has the capability to go beyond delivery of the
news, justified criticism, and the expos6, to the actual creation of public
attitudes and opinions. Naturally, public reaction to events is shaped by what
is delivered to us through the news media. This dissemination of the news is
the major constitutional function of a free press. Nevertheless, the choice of
stories and the way they are presented have a major influence on the public
response. If we hear about potential riots, riots become possible. 6 If we are
told that President Clinton has been defeated in Congress," then the
LAW OF TORTS § 116 (5th ed. 1984).
26 See, e.g., Cary Darling et al., Did T. V Coverage Help Fuel Chaos?, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 30, 1992, at 8 (discussing riots related to trial of Los Angeles police officers for
the beating of Rodney King).
27 See, e.g., John A. Farrell, Clinton's Stimulus Plan Dies in Senate, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 22, 1993, at 1 (discussing Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell's
withdrawl of President Clinton's job stimulus package because of the failure of Senate
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Clinton presidency is in trouble. Public reaction and opinion are formed by
what we get through the news and the way we get it.
Lately, this has taken on somewhat of a new twist; something I have
chosen to call the journalism of blame. The national media now must have a
winner and a loser, and someone to blame for problematic events. This may
be a product of our cultural craving for victory and defeat (the who's num-
ber one, fist-in-the-air, victory celebration phenomenon). More likely, the
current journalistic edge flows directly from the efforts of the press to put
too fine a point on a story (the bottom line, let's-get-to-the-bottom-of-this
phenomenon).
This juristic drive to get at the truth or reduce every story to a victory or
a loss ignores the complexity of events, discredits the appointed fallguy, and
slants the story in the direction the finger is pointed. The public is the real
loser. The journalism of blame exposes the target to public ridicule and
prevents, or at least distracts, the reading and viewing public from judging
affairs for themselves. To this extent, the news media has forsaken the role
of conduit of the news with occasional commentary in favor of that of
wholesale news critic. The only "straight" news available anymore is the
tragically mundane-the missing child, the drive-by shooting, and the bus
wreck. Even then, the mother's supervision was lax, law enforcement was
inadequate, or the bus company carelessly employed the driver. If the story
has any political content, the onslaught can be unrelenting.
The press consistently blamed President Bush for neglecting domestic
affairs and consequently ushering in economic recession.28 It cost him the
presidency.29 There is probably no better archetype of the journalism of
blame than the Branch Davidian episode in Waco, Texas. From the begin-
ning, when agents from the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
stormed the Davidian compound on February 28, 1993, leaving four federal
agents and six cult members dead and a standoff in its wake,30 the press
had to have someone to blame. Interestingly, this blame was not cast on
David Koresh and his followers, who fired the first deadly shots, but on the
Government for undertaking the raid in the first place, or at least for the
way in which it was conducted. 31 Seven weeks later, when the standoff re-
sulted in a fiery inferno leaving as many as eighty-five dead,32 the blame-
laying was relentless. It was the FBI's fault for precipitously and carelessly
Democrats to end a Republicn filibuster on April 21, 1993).
28 See, e.g., Martin Woollacott, Ninety Three: The World, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 2,
1993, at 83 ("In America, years of neglect of domestic problems and a willful refusal to
face up to the real problems of the economy led to the defeat of George Bush.").
29 See id.
30 E.g., Howard Chua-Eoan, Tripped Up by Lies, TIME, Oct. 11, 1993, at 39.
3' See, e.g., Melinda Black et al., Secrets of the Cult, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1993, at
52.
32 Chua-Eoan, supra note 30.
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using heavy military equipment to break holes in the walls of the compound
in order to inject teargas.33 It was Attorney General Janet Reno's fault for
authorizing the plan.34 It was FBI Director William Sessions' fault-he
should have known better.33 It was President Clinton's fault.36 After all,
he is the President, surely he must have been involved in orchestrating this
event. Everything from inexperience to incompetence to ignorance was
charged." It became so absurd that one commentator questioned why the
FBI had not consulted psychiatrists or psychologists familiar with cult be-
havior in order to determine the likely reaction of the Branch Davidians to
the FBI's tactics. 38 Curiously, seldom in all the early fault-letting were Da-
vid Koresh and his group ever blamed for their own demise.
Why this blame phenomenon? A story with a slant or a culprit piques
the interest of readers in a way that a straightforward, objective explanation
of events does not. Expository news stories sell papers and improve ratings.
The news media has the constitutional imprimatur to satisfy the public thirst
for knowing who is inept, who is foolish, and who is at fault.39 The press
is able to put this constitutional license to maximum use because of a col-
lective national insecurity regarding government and power; an insecurity
that began in the 1 960s with the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Robert
Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr.; an insecurity that was fueled by the
Vietnam War, the counterculture movement, the Watergate scandal, and the
Iran hostage crisis. These events occurred during the formative political
years of much of today's adult population, leaving a current of distrust of
government and suspicion of power that plays into the hands of a media
bent on the expos. 40
America's lust for the shyster and the fallguy, however, is only a facil-
itator of the journalism of blame. It has fueled an already existing self-im-
portance on the part of a news media driven to "break a story"; a drive not
" E.g., Alan A. Stone, How the FBI Helped Fuel the Waco Fire, HARPER'S MAG.,
Feb. 1994, at 15.
14 E.g., Alexander Cockburn, Waco Revisited, 257 NATION 414 (1993).
" E.g., Steve McGonigle, Report Faults FBI on Cult, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 16, 1993, at 24A.
36 E.g., Eric Alterman, Thumbs Down: The Punditocracy Has All But Declared
Clinton a Failure, MOTHER JONES, July-Aug. 1993, at 52.
3' E.g., Chua-Eoan, supra note 30.
38 Stone, supra note 33, at 15.
" See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
40 Ronald Reagan's so called "teflon presidency" escaped much of this blame-laying
due to a combination of factors: Reagan's experience as an actor, his communications
skills and those of his staff, the politics of tax cutting, and patriotism engendered by the
assaults on Grenada and Libya. George Bush also was saved for a time by the wake of
the Reagan mystique, the invasion of Panama, and then the Gulf War, but the media
jumped on him at the first sign of economic trouble.
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just to be first at reporting an item, but also to get to the essence of events,
and to outdo each other in the process. Although it is of considerable con-
stitutional significance, objective reporting and presention of a story is mun-
dane work. When coupled with explanation, analysis, and the fixing of re-
sponsibility, however, reporting takes on a certain grandiosity. Consequent-
ly, it is easy for the press to see these latter tasks as its constitutional role
and its moral and ethical obligation.
This would all be fine if press self-righteousness did not frequently
digress into zealotry and outright ruthlessness. The word "break" has more
definitions in the dictionary than most other words," and unfortunately the
efforts of members of the news media to "break" a story sometimes result in
a story being broken, not in the sense of "mak[ing] known,"42 but in the
sense of "render[ing] useless or inoperative."43 Although this characteriza-
tion may be a little strong ("damage" is probably a more accurate term),
maneuvering by the press to present a story with an angle can become prob-
lematic.
As a result of press zealotry and ruthlessness, reputations are tarnished,
and public images and credibility are impaired with an already distrustful
public. There is no doubt that the media helps to shape public opinion, and
to the extent that a news item is overworked by the press, public opinion
can be out of kilter with reality. In this sense, the journalism of blame can
be costly. The attempt to assess responsibility-both for good deeds and bad
ones-is the constitutional right of a free press. Currently, however, good
performances tend to be neglected in favor of poor ones."
The news media makes dramatic investments in the identification and
isolation of blameworthy parties. A number of public persons have main-
tained libel actions against members of the news media for just such efforts.
General William Westmoreland sued CBS for $120 million alleging that a
documentary, entitled* The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception,5
wrongly blamed him for the U.S. failure in Vietnam. 6 Ariel Sharon, for-
mer Defense Minister of Israel, commenced a $50 million libel suit against
Time magazine for suggesting that he was responsible for the massacre of
Palestinians at refugee camps in West Beirut.47 William P. Tavoulareas,
41 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 233-34
(3d ed. 1992) (providing 74 definitions for the word "break" which take up over half a
page).
42 Id. at 233.
43 Id.
' For example, George Bush was given little credit in the 1992 campaign for his
accomplishments in foreign affairs; Bill Clinton was given little credit in the first 100
days of his presidency for his handling of the crisis in Russia and Boris Yeltsin's plight.
41 CBS television broadcast, Jan. 23, 1982.
46 Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1170, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
41 Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
1994] 689
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
President and CEO of Mobil Oil Corporation, sued the Washington Post for
alleging that he used his influence and Mobil's assets to set up his son in
the shipping business.48 More recently, Michael Jordan of the National Bas-
ketball Association's Chicago Bulls threatened to sue the press following
reports blaming his late night gambling for Chicago's loss to the New York
Knicks in the second game of their 1993 playoff series."
Another feature of the current bottom line journalism is the win-lose
mentality. If there is no one to blame, then the journalistic appetite for abso-
lute demarcation necessitates a winner and a loser. There is no better exam-
ple than President Clinton's early efforts in Congress. The President lost in
his effort to get Congress to pass a jobs stimulus package,50 resulting in a
win for Senator Bob Dole and the filibustering Republicans, and squeaked
out a narrow victory in Congress with respect to his budget bill.5 On the
day that the North American Free Trade Agreement was narrowly passed,
Peter Jennings began the ABC Evening News by saying: "We are going to
begin tonight with winners and losers."52 President Clinton's efforts were
played out as a dramatic contest between Congress and a new president.53
Surprisingly, the news media paid much more attention to this angle than to
the content of the job stimulus package or the substance of the President's
budget proposal. Moreover, virtually no one mentioned the logic or fairness
of the Senate's filibuster rules or the fact that the Republicans in both the
Senate and the House of Representatives indignantly voted as a block
against the job stimulus bill and the proposed budget. More recently, the
President prevailed when Congress narrowly passed the Crime Bill,54 and
the Administration was dealt a blow when the health care reform initiative
died in Congress.55
The tragedy with this kind of journalistic display is that it neglects sub-
stantive analysis of policies and events and concomitantly facilitates the
4 Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 817 F.2d 90 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987). For a thorough discussion of the
Westmoreland, Sharon, and Tavoulareas cases, see RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE
PRESS (1986).
49 E.g., Frank Luksa, NBA Not Willing to Gamble When it Comes to Its Superstar,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 6, 1993, at 4B.
50 See Bill Rumbler, Economy Sputters, New Report Shows, CHI.-SUN TIMES, Apr.
24, 1993, at 30.
1 See Roger Mathews, Gore Gives Clinton Victory in Senate on Budget Bill, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at 1.
52 ABC World News Tonight: Clinton Seeking to Make Peace with Unions After
NAFTA (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 18, 1993).
53 Id.
51 See, e.g., Kathleen Adams, The Week, TIME, Sept. 26, 1994, at 9.




formation of public opinion based largely on irrelevancies. It should come
as no surprise that President Clinton's job approval rating dropped sharply
following the Senate's "defeat" of his stimulus package56 and improved
after his "victory" on the budget and NAFTA 7 Polls are an important part
of American sociopolitical life, and the journalism of blame and the win-
lose mentality is a wonderful catalyst for these devices. The slant placed on
the news affects public reaction in the polls and public reaction in the polls
accurately reflects voter reaction in an election. Of course, this literally
means that the news media has an influence on national politics and policies
by the twist it places on news events-by laying blame and by labeling
winners and losers.
IV. THE HISTORY OF LIBEL PROTECTION FOR THE PRESS
I doubt that the United States Supreme Court was thinking in these
terms when the Justices decided New York Times and extended that holding
in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts"8 and Associated Press v. Walker.9 As
virtually all lawyers, law students, and journalists know, the combined effect
of these decisions was to preclude libel liability unless a public official or
public figure plaintiff' could establish that the story was false and that it
was published with actual malice, defined to mean knowledge of falsity or
56 Rupert Comwell, Play it in Another Key, Bill, THE INDEP., Apr. 29, 1993, at 29.
57 Carl P. Leubsdorf, On-the-job Learning Marks Clinton's Year: Experts Say He
Finished '93 on Upswing, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 16, 1994, at 1A.
58 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
59 389 U.S. 28 (1967). This view does not color my own earlier writings on the
subject. See Ashdown, Constitutional Policy-Making, supra note 4; Ashdown, Media
Reporting and Privacy, supra note 4; Gerald G. Ashdown, Editorial Privilege and Free-
dom of the Press: Herbert v. Lando in Perspective, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 303 (1980)
[hereinafter Ashdown, Editorial Privilege]; Gerald G. Ashdown, Of Public Figures and
Public Interest-the Libel Law Conundrum, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937 (1984).
60 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court defined "public
figure" in the following manner:
Th[e] [public figure] designation may rest on either of two alternative bases. In
some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that
he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly,
an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public con-
troversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In
either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public
questions.
Id. at 351. Although the Court narrowed the definition somewhat in later cases, see
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-69 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134-35 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453
(1976), the definition remains quite generous.
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reckless disregard for the truth.61 Practically speaking, the press is immune
from libel judgments in coverage of public persons, i.e., politicians or peo-
ple involved in setting national, regional, or local policies. Further reduced,
this means that there is no measure of control on the behavior of the news
media.
In one sense New York Times and its progeny were designed to accom-
plish this result. At the time New York Times was decided, truth and the
privilege of fair comment were the only defenses to a libel action.62 Believ-
ing these two defenses to be inadequate to protect a free press against self-
censorship of true as well as marginal material, the Supreme Court devel-
oped the "actual malice" standard to prevent both internal and external re-
strictions on the media, and to remove the threat to the First Amendment
that the facts in New York Times revealed.63
The New York Times case arose during the height of the civil rights
movement in the South. L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner of Mont-
gomery, Alabama, sued the New York Times (and four black Alabama cler-
gymen) for running a paid political advertisement which portrayed the plight
of black leaders and civil rights workers involved in the civil rights struggle
in Alabama.' Even though there were only minor inaccuracies in the ad,
and the copy never referred to Sullivan and only occasionally referred to the
police, an Alabama jury awarded Sullivan $500,000, the full amount
claimed, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.65
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court interpreted the First
Amendment's Free Press Clause to require a public official plaintiff to
prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth in order to
recover.66 The need was apparent. Free discussion of public officials and
public issues required this protection.
The development and implementation of this constitutional protection
over the last thirty years, however, has left the press largely unregulated.
Journalism is the only profession essentially not subject to some form of
regulation. Elected officials can be censored, impeached, and voted out of
office. Doctors, lawyers, and other professionals are vulnerable to malprac-
tice lawsuits and suspension or expulsion from their professions. Law en-
forcement personnel are subject to claims of civil rights violations and the
use of excessive force, and so on. As suggested above, the unrestrained
news media has garnered tremendous influence over the formation of public
6 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
62 See id. at 267 (discussing the defenses of truth and fair comment under Alabama
law which applied to the case).
63 Id. at 282-83.
6 Id. at 256-57.
65 id.
66 Id. at 280.
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opinion and policy. This influence raises the question of whether rethinking
the scope of the constitutional privilege is in order.
A. The Development of a Negligence Standard for Private Individuals
Although the Supreme Court has meandered somewhat through the libel
field,67 since the mid-1970s it has by-and-large withdrawn from an expan-
sive view of the Constitutional privilege. The two most notable defamation
cases of the 1970s were decided against the media.6" In 1971, the Court
applied the actual malice standard to libelous statements about private indi-
viduals involved in matters of public interest.69 The Court reasoned that the
policy behind the actual malice standard applied to the discussion of all
issues of public interest irrespective of the characterization of the person
involved.7 ' Three years later, with two new justices joining a five-justice
majority, the Court reversed itself.7' Justice Powell's majority opinion in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. reasoned that a private individual, unlike a pub-
lic person, did not have access to the channels of communication to rebut a
defamatory falsehood and had not assumed the risk of publicity by volun-
tarily entering the public limelight.72 The Court held that the state's interest
in compensating private individuals for harm inflicted by defamatory
statements was therefore correspondingly greater.73 Consequently, the states
were free to impose a negligence standard in the case of a private plaintiff
67 Compare Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448 (1976) and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (deciding
against media defendants) with Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)
and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) and Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) and Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (deciding in favor of media defendant) and
with Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) and Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) and Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) and
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (deciding against media defen-
dants).
68 Herbert, 441 U.S. at 153; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
69 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Although Justice Brennan's
opinion in Rosenbloom spoke only for a plurality of three, the reasoning of Justices
Black and Douglas that the First Amendment provides the media with absolute immuni-
ty from liability for defamation would also support the holding. See id. at 57 (Black, J.,
concurring); see also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S 130, 170-72 (1967)
(Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring).
70 Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43-44.
11 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
72 Id. at 344.
71 Id. at 343-47.
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libel suit.74
The Court distinguished public persons from private persons, defining
"public figure" in the following manner: a person could either "achieve such
pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure ... in all con-
texts" or he could "voluntarily inject[] himself or [be] drawn into a particu-
lar public controversy and thereby become[] a public figure for a limited
range of issues."'' The latter aspect of this definition was narrowed by later
cases which concluded that in order to become a public figure on a limited
range of issues, a person had to voluntarily inject himself into a public de-
bate in an effort to influence the resolution of a matter of public concern.76
Thus, the definition of public figure became more circumscribed, excluding
persons who are simply involved in a matter of public interest. Had the
Court not placed this limitation on the definition of public figure, it would
in effect have reverted back to the earlier Rosenbloom rule.
B. Refusal to Recognize an Editorial Privilege
Five years after the Court drew the dichotomy between public and pri-
vate persons, it refused to provide the press with an editorial privilege in
libel litigation.77 Barry Lando, a producer for the CBS program "60 Min-
utes," claimed that a discovery request and order asking him to answer
questions concerning his conversations, conclusions, deductions, intent, and
state of mind in researching and preparing a program would have an intoler-
able effect on the editorial process contrary to the First Amendment.7" The
Court rejected this argument and held that such protection would constitute
a substantial interference with the ability of defamation plaintiffs to establish
the subjective element of reckless disregard for the truth by direct inquiry
into the publisher's thoughts, opinions, and conclusions.79 Given the bur-
den faced by a public figure plaintiff in a libel suit, this decision seems
sensible. I have always viewed Lando, however, as more of a troublemaker
for freedom of the press than any other decision since New York Times.8"
Following New York Times, the greatest threat to press freedom was not
actual damage awards in defamation cases. Rather, it was the financial and
journalistic burden imposed by extended discovery into the editorial process,
and the demands of actual litigation.8 When the Supreme Court lent its
14 Id. at 347-48.
75 Id. at 351.
76 See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164-65 (1979); Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979); Firestone, 424 U.S. at 453-55.
77 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979).
78 Id. at 169-70.
79 Id. at 175-77.
80 See Ashdown, Editorial Privilege, supra note 59.
81 In Herbert, defendant Barry Lando's deposition was taken in twenty-six sessions
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imprimatur to unrestrained discovery in libel cases, it undid much of what
had been accomplished in New York Times because the rigor of the "actual
malice" standard permits more extensive discovery than in pre-New York
Times cases.82
C. Pendulum Swings Towards Plaintiffs?
Although in the 1980s the Court vacillated in media libel cases, indi-
cating uncertain direction and fragmented viewpoints,83 the latest two deci-
sions signal a subtle plaintiff's bent. The most recent decision is the
somewhat notorious case of the psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson versus Janet
Malcolm and The New Yorker magazine.84 Masson involved the alleged
manufacture, or at least substantial embellishment, of statements placed in
quotation marks and attributed to the plaintiff.5 Masson claimed that
Malcolm's articles and book essentially fabricated ill-serving quotations that
Masson never made.86 It should come as no surprise that the Supreme
Court reversed the grant of summary judgment by the lower courts in favor
of the defendants, and held that this journalistic behavior could satisfy the
New York Times actual malice standard if "the alteration result[ed] in a
material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement."87
At the same time, however, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion ap-
peared to finely balance the interests of defamation plaintiffs and freedom of
the press by rejecting the contention that any change beyond the correction
of grammar and syntax demonstrates actual malice.88 Recognizing the jour-
nalistic realities of converting a speaker's statements to print, Justice Kenne-
dy concluded that "[i]f an author alters a speaker's words but effects no
material change in meaning, including any meaning conveyed by the manner
or fact of expression, the speaker suffers no injury to reputation that is com-
and lasted for over a year. It comprised 2903 pages and 240 exhibits. Herbert v. Lando,
568 F.2d 974, 982 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). See SMOLLA, supra note
48, at 71 (describing the extensive discovery in Herbert v. Lando).
82 Justice White's majority opinion in Herbert conceded that "it would not be sur-
prising" if the "actual malice" standard led to more discovery than in pre-New York
Times cases, and "it would follow that the costs and other burdens of this kind of litiga-
tion would escalate and become much more troublesome for both plaintiffs and defen-
dants." Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176.
83 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-12
(2d ed. 1988).
'4 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
85 Id. at 499.
86 Id. at 500-02.
87 Id. at 517.
$8 Id. at 514.
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pensable as a defamation."89
Nevertheless, the ephemeral nature of this apparent license was revealed
by the Court's rejection of the court of appeals' "rational interpretation"
test.9° The Ninth Circuit had held that an altered quotation was protected so
long as it was a "rational interpretation" of an actual statement. 9' Justice
Kennedy rather quickly rejected the application of this standard to the use of
quotation marks.92 His majority opinion concluded that such an interpretive
license was available only when the author was relying on ambiguous sourc-
es.93 To the contrary, the use of quotations indicates that the writer is not
interpreting ambiguities, but is attempting to convey what the speaker actu-
ally said.94 Justice Kennedy stated:
Were we to assess quotations under a rational interpretation
standard, we would give journalists the freedom to place
statements in their subjects' mouths without fear of liability.
By eliminating any method of distinguishing between the
statements of the subject and the interpretation of the author,
we would diminish to a great degree the trustworthiness of
the printed word, and eliminate the real meaning of quota-
tions.95
Masson raises a couple of interesting questions, the resolution of which
has the potential to profoundly impact the work of journalists. First, what is
the essential difference between a permissible alteration of a speaker's
words which "makes no material change in meaning" and an impermissible
"rational interpretation" of the speaker's remarks, i.e., when does a rational
interpretation become a material alteration? The dilemma stems from the
fact that an alteration of comments-paraphrasing-even when placed in
quotes, is evidently all right as long as there is no material change in mean-
ing. Such a practice, however, could be described as a rational interpreta-
tion. The difficulty lies in delineating the difference between a rational
interpretation that makes no material change and one that does. This dichot-
89 Id. at 516.
90 Id. at 518.
9' Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
92 Masson, 501 U.S. at 518.
13 Id. at 519.
94 Id.
" Id. at 520. The Court concluded that even the press would be ill served by such a
standard because of the reluctance of newsworthy figures to talk with them given the
realization that their words could be transformed to some extent as long as the bounds
of rational interpretation were satisfied. Id.
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omy creates confusion for lawyers, judges, and juries, and is bound to deter
the journalistic use of quotations.
The result may well be the attribution of statements to speakers without
the use of quotation marks. This raises the second serious question left by
Masson-does the holding apply only when the speaker's remarks are
placed in quotes? In other words, are rational interpretations that might
amount to material alterations permissible as long as quotation marks are not
used? Despite the consistent reference to "quotations" in Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion," one would think not, because that would essentially
emasculate the holding. Thus, it is only logical that Masson liability would
apply to any material misrepresentation of a speaker's remarks, regardless of
whether quotation marks are used. It is here that writers and reporters will
have to be careful. We are all familiar with the often made claim by a
source that he or she was misquoted or that his or her remarks were misrep-
resented by the press. If the misrepresentation is material, then it would
seem also to be in reckless disregard of the truth for it is generally the re-
porter himself who takes the statement and then is accused of
mischaracterizing it.
The other recent libel decision is Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.97 In
Milkovich, a sports reporter for defendant's newspaper suggested that the
plaintiff, a high school wrestling coach, had lied under oath.98 These alle-
gations stemmed from an altercation at a wrestling meet which resulted in
Milkovich being disciplined and his team being suspended from competition
in the state tournament.99 Several parents and wrestlers successfully sought
a restraining order against the state athletic association."0 Milkovich al-
legedly lied at this proceeding."0 After protracted litigation, the Ohio state
courts ultimately held that although the plaintiff was not a public official or
figure, the reporter's assertions amounted to "constitutionally protected
opinion. ' '
In the United States Supreme Court the respondent Lorain Journal relied
on the following often-cited passage from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
96 There is a reference to quotation marks, quotations, quotes, or punctuation on
virtually every page of Justice Kennedy's analysis for the majority. See id. at 499-504,
507-25.
9' 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
98 Id. at 3.
99 Id. at 4.
100 Id.
101 Id.
'02 Id. at 7-8.
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for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact." 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court concluded that the word
"opinion" in the second sentence referred to the word "idea" in the first
sentence so that ideas are protected but statements in the form of opinion
which contain provably false assertions of fact are not."° The majority de-
termined that free expression was adequately secured by the requirement of
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps °5 that "the plaintiff bear the bur-
den of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages,"'0
6
and the line of cases providing protection for statements that cannot "rea-
sonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts" about the individual.' 7 No
separate constitutional privilege for "opinion" was available. The majority
then concluded that the statements in the reporter's column were actionable
because a reasonable factfinder could conclude that they implied that the
petitioner Milkovich had committed perjury in a judicial proceeding.' 8
Following Milkovich, it is clear that statements that contain provably
false assertions and are not loose hyperbole, although in the form of opin-
ion, subject reporters and the news media to liability for libel.'0 9 When
Milkovich is considered along with Masson, which placed potential liability
on the fabrication or embellishment of statements attributable to a particular
source,"0 it is apparent that the Supreme Court has moved in the direction
of circumscribing the flexibility and maneuverability of the media in putting
a certain bent or "spin" on a story. No longer can statements be carelessly
and unfairly attributed to a particular person; nor can opinions about an
individual's involvement in an event be protected when they contain
provably false assertions of fact.
'03 Id. at 18 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)).
104 Id.
1.5 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
'06 Id. at 776.
07 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 50 (1988) and also referring to Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Let-
ter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)) (alteration in original).
08 Id. at 21.
For example, the mayor is a thief; Carol Burnett is a lesbian; ATF ignored clear
warnings that the Branch Davidians knew that ATF was about to raid the Davidian
compound; NASA officials ignored sound warnings that the Challenger Space Shuttle
would explode; Kurt Waldheim was a Nazi officer. The latter two examples are from
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 34-35 (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
"o See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
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These two recent libel decisions, however, do not seem to have slowed
the media much. Stories are pressed to the breaking point, blame is laid,
winners and losers are established, and public opinion is created. New York
Times and its progeny, irrespective of any current anti-defendant trend, have
truly eliminated press self-censorship, or, put another way, have prevented
the formation of any governor or self-control on media behavior. Contempo-
rary examples of this trend continue to emerge, including the media's
hounding of Michael Jackson,"' and its coverage of the amorous adven-
tures and infidelity of Bill Clinton." 2 Regardless of the harm done to
Clinton and his family, his presidency is likely to survive; Michael
Jackson's career, regardless of his guilt or innocence, will not.
Even as this essay is written, the O.J. Simpson media debacle is spin-
ning like an unrelenting whirlwind around a gullible, titillated public. The
Simpson trial is, of course, a classic example of the journalism of blame, the
determination of fault, and the win-lose mentality, at its best. Who is to
blame? O.J. Simpson or the criminal justice system? Who is winning (or
losing) at each step of the process? The prosecution or the defense
team?13 In this onslaught, the possibility of someone being libeled is ab-
solutely irrelevant.
V. RE-EXAMINING THE NEW YORK TIMES STANDARD
To my mind the current state of affairs raises the question of re-exam-
ining the constitutional privilege available to the press in the case of public
officials and public figures. Although New York Times was wonderfully con-
ceived and born out of the civil rights era of the 1960s, it may have outlived
its usefulness or, in the language of the Supreme Court when referring to
outdated precedent, it may not have withstood the test of time."4 The re-
quirement that a public figure plaintiff in a defamation action prove actual
malice, defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth on
the part of the defendant, is virtually an insurmountable barrier to liability.
Even though some public figure plaintiffs have forced media defendants to
incur substantial litigation costs"5 and a few plaintiffs have actually recov-
... E.g., Jeff Wilson, Jackson Proclaims Innocence, Tells of Body Search 'Ordeal,'
DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 23, 1993, at 4A; Boy Files Suit Accusing Michael Jackson of
Sexual Abuse, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1993, at B1.
"2 E.g., Gary Blonston & Aaron Epstein, To Many Americans Honesty is Only Real
Issue, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 22, 1993, at 10A; Howard Kurtz, News Organizations
Differ on Relevance of Clinton Allegations, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1993, at A16.
..3 Hard Knock; Simpson's Defense Team Takes a Hammering, TIME, Sept. 5, 1994,
at 45.
"4 E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
"5 See SMOLLA, supra note 48, at 73-79. For example, although CBS has not dis-
closed its legal costs in the Westmoreland case, reports place them between $5 and $10
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ered damages,'6 the media by and large remains uninfluenced by the
threat of libel judgments. Blame laying and vilification continues undeterred.
One possible means of dealing with uncontrolled press power would be
to reconsider the balance between freedom of the press and the protection of
personal reputation. The media at the end of the twentieth century is much
more powerful than it was thirty years ago when New York Times was de-
cided. Although the press has historically stressed the scoop, scandal, cor-
ruption, and wrongdoing, it is only in the last ten years that such exposes
have been spread around the country and world at the speed of light through
satellite and computer communication. The term mass communication is
now truly self-describing. The modem media has tremendous ability to
influence public opinion. Where stories are embroidered, embellished, or
erroneous, there is little chance that some altruistic media member will be
forthcoming to facilitate the market's self-correction.
On the other hand, despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's ode to personal
reputation in Milkovich,' 7 personal reputation is probably no more valu-
able now than it ever has been. Nevertheless, we have witnessed the damage
and recognized the potential devastation that the modem media can create in
this realm. The urge to harm a person's reputation and credibility, and the
relative ease with which the press is able to do so are contemporaneously
quite potent. Advancement in mass communication is directly proportional
to the ability to destroy individual reputations. When this is coupled with
the other elements of press power-precipitously undermining confidence in
public officials, creating public opinion, and fostering a win-lose mentali-
ty-placing additional weight on the individual side of the free
press/personal reputation balance seems worth investigating.
One possible consideration would be to adopt the Gertz approach in the
case of all plaintiffs, public as well as private."8 This, of course, would
have the effect of tempering a public plaintiff's burden to proof of falsity
and fault (presumably negligence) instead of the more demanding New York
Times standard-knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." 9
In Gertz, the Court accorded preferential treatment to the reputations of pri-
vate individuals on two grounds: (1) private persons were more vulnerable
to injury than public figures because they did not have access to the chan-
nels of communication to counteract false statements; and (2) private per-
sons were more deserving of protection because they had not assumed the
million. Id. at 75.
.6 See supra note 18.
"1 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (quoting WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3).
IS Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
"9 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
700 [Vol. 3:2
JOURNALISM OF BLAME
risk of publicity. 0
The Court's distinction in Gertz between public and private individuals
was never very convincing. The argument that public figures usually enjoy
significantly greater access to the channels of communication, and hence
have a better opportunity to rebut false statements, is little more than an
empty generalization. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent in Gertz,
access to the media is available only to very prominent people who com-
mand media attention,"' e.g., Bill Clinton, Michael Jackson, and now the
lawyers in the O.J. Simpson case. For all other people, whether public or
private, access depends on continued media interest and the unlikely willing-
ness to contradict the original story. More importantly, even where a rebuttal
is published, it is generally discounted as self-serving.'
The Court in Gertz relied more heavily on the rationale that private
citizens, unlike public figures, do not assume the risk of public scrutiny and
therefore deserve more protection from defamation. 3 Although the validi-
ty of this argument depends largely on the definition of public figure,2 4 it
does not address the policy question of why an individual who more or less
willingly enters public life or public debate must expose his personal life to
the threat of being laid to waste by the news media. Being subject to false
accusations or stories of marginal accuracy resulting from incursions into
personal privacy must be a profound deterrent to entering the public arena.
It is questionable whether legal rules should encourage, or at least fail to
discourage, this phenomenon. Additionally, this assumption of risk theory
simply does not apply to most individuals classified as public figures. For
the most part, these people do not choose to be talented, and in any event,
the actor, musician, or professional athlete no more invites public attention
to his private life than does a private individual unexpectedly involved in a
public event. Finally, assumption of the risk has generally been discarded in
tort law in favor of contributory or comparative negligence.2 5 These latter
concepts depend on a finding of unreasonable behavior in order to limit a
defendant's obligation (duty) to a plaintiff. Since voluntarily entering the
public realm-and thereby exposing oneself to media attention--cannot be
viewed as unreasonable, it seems unfair for libel law to make it more diffi-
cult for this class of plaintiffs to recover based on the notion of assumption
of the risk.
20 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
"2 Id. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122 The Gertz majority itself recognized the weakness of the self-help rationale. See
id. at 344 n.9.
123 Id. at 344-46.
124 Both the public personality and a person who voluntarily injects himself into a
public controversy fall within the current definition. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448, 453-54 (1976); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
2' KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 68, at 495-96.
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Applying the Gertz standard to all libel plaintiffs would not expose the
press to wholesale liability. First, Philadelphia Newspapers requires that a
plaintiff prove that the material published about him is false.'26 Second,
the Court in Gertz held that the plaintiff, in that case a private individual,
could not recover without some proof of fault, i.e., negligence, and then
only actual damages were available.'27 Presumed or punitive damages were
recoverable only on satisfaction of the New York Times actual malice stan-
dard. 28 Thus, with the extension of Gertz to public officials and figures,
plaintiffs would still have to prove falsity and fault (negligence) and their
awards would be limited to actual damages if they could not satisfy the cur-
rent actual malice standard. In other words, there would be no extension of
potential liability for large debilitating punitive awards.
The real question is whether this new balance would both temper press
power, ameliorating its abuses, and avoid dangerous self-censorship. To the
extent that the New York Times actual malice standard essentially immunizes
media defendants from liability, a negligence standard should make them
more circumspect, especially with respect to scandalous stories or expos6s
with only marginal substantiation. The threat of increased litigation costs
alone should encourage greater care before certain material is published.
On the contrary, there is no reason to suspect self-censorship of hard
news that can be substantially documented, regardless of whether the repu-
tations of public persons are tarnished. The media would have nothing to
fear from a negligence standard; summary judgment would continue to be
available to protect against litigation costs. Similarly, the exposure of politi-
cal blunder and corruption is not likely to be restrained where reporters have
solid reasons to believe a story is true; in such a case, there is simply no
negligence. For example, coverage of Bill Clinton's alleged infidelity and
Michael Jackson's alleged pedophilia would clearly still be protected. Con-
sequently, the public would continue to get what it needs from the First
Amendment-information to facilitate participatory democracy, self-fulfill-
ment, and personal development. England has no special privilege for the
media in libel litigation'29 and it continues to have a vibrant and robust
26 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
127 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48.
128 Id. at 348-49.
29 See Sarah 0. Kambour, Note, A Local Authority Is Not Entitled to Maintain an
Action for Damages in Libel Against a Publication Where the Publication Addressed
the Propriety of Actions Taken by the Authority in the Course of Its Governmental and
Administrative Function-Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, Ltd., 1993
App. Cas. 534., 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1549, 1550-51 (1994). In Derbyshire, howev-
er, the English House of Lords did conclude for the first time that a local governmental
entity could not mainatin a libel action for damages. Id. at 1556, 1577. Although a step
in the direction of the American First Amendment privilege, the holding appears limit-




In the seventies and early eighties, I wrote a series of articles defending
the news media.130 The development of media power in the last decade,
however, has left me troubled. Journalism is the only profession or activity
not subject to liability for negligence or otherwise subject to some form of
legal control. Maybe it is time for it to be brought in line.
don), Feb. 24, 1993, at A16.
The High Court of Australia, the equivalent of the United States Supreme Court,
recently placed constitutional limits for the first time on libel suits by political figures,
but in doing so adopted a negligence oriented standard of liability. See Anthony Lewis,
Abroad at Home: A Widening Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994, at A31.
130 See supra notes 4, 59.
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